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Abstract 
Two experimental treatments were conducted to investigate the destructive and productive behaviours 
of employees in a tournament.  Employees could either offer a high effort level or engage in sabotage to advance 
their relative position in the tournament.  Since directing the sabotage against one’s opponent could guarantee 
advancement, and destructive action was found to be a less costly method to improve one’s position in the 
tournament compared with effort, the results showed that sabotaging was rampant when the wage differential 
between the winner and the loser was high.  As sabotage was mainly induced by the perception that it can 
improve one’s chances of winning the prize, this perception was diminished in the three-player tournament.  In 
this treatment, the saboteur not only helped himself through sabotaging, but also other co-workers.  The saboteur 
might receive sabotage from another co-worker, which caused both saboteurs to suffer a low payoff.  When 
employees were not assured that sabotaging could help them win the prize, they competed with effort and the 
destructive activities were significantly reduced. 
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1. Introduction 
An incentive scheme in an organization is often implemented as a competitive compensation mechanism 
such as a tournament.  In this mechanism, the agent with the highest relative performance is rewarded with a 
higher monetary incentive than lower performing agents.  This market-based managerial style is practiced mainly 
because of high monitoring costs and hidden action problems (for an overview of the tournament literature, see 
Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Gibbons, 1998; Lazear, 1999; Prendergast, 1999). 
In a tournament, a reward is used as an incentive device to induce an efficient effort level from the 
agents.  However, since the reward is based on relative performance, agents can either extend more effort to 
advance their relative position in the tournament or sabotage other co-workers to lower their competitors’ relative 
position.  The central finding in the existing literature shows that destructive activities (i.e., sabotage) plague the 
mechanism to the extent that a high effort level becomes very costly and agents find it unprofitable to offer a high 
level of effort (see, for example, Drago & Turnbull, 1991; Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2005; Harbring, Irlenbusch, 
Krakel, & Selton, 2007; Gürtler & Münster, 2010).  The destructive activities can take any form of blocking 
cooperation such as withholding viable information, giving false information, and damaging tools used by co-
workers; research by Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and Prendergast and Topel (1996) shows 
that employees waste resources on influencing their superiors rather than engaging in productive activities. 
Among the reasons for the high level of sabotage activities in tournaments highlighted by the past 
research are the large wage differential in the tournaments (Lazear, 1989), the revelation of the identity of the 
front runners (Gürtler & Münster, 2010), and the solutions suggested are pay equality, a seniority promotion 
system (Chen, 2003), and external recruitment (Lazear, 1999; Chen, 2005).  However, the suggestions offered by 
the past literature may lead to other problems such as loss of incentive to work among employees (Chen, 2003; 
Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2005).  As highlighted by Lazear (1989), productivity and sabotage are two main 
concerns when designing a competitive compensation scheme; although tournament with high reward prize can 
induce optimal effort, it is often achieved with higher destructive activities. 
As shown by Lazear (1989) and Chen (2003), the main reason for employees to sabotage is the incentive 
to engage in such destructive activity.  If competitive compensation mechanism can enhance performance, then 
organization could implement the mechanism along with design that could diminish this incentive.  The incentive 
lies in the guaranteed opportunity to advance one’s position in the tournament without exerting much productive 
effort.  For example, in the two-player tournament, employee A always has an incentive to sabotage employee B 
because B is the only competitor.  Even if employee A does not know the performance of employee B, it is 
always in his best interest to offer a low level of effort and sabotage.  Even when the number of players is larger, 
such as in Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008), the activities are not reduced. 
The main aim of the paper is to study the incentive effect on productive and destructive behaviours 
among employees, and how the incentive can be diminished to mitigate sabotage.  Since the activities are not 
observable in a real setting, the paper conducts an experimental study to investigate the behaviours.   
The study is motivated by the Chinese historical novel, Romance of Three Kingdoms, in which three 
ancient warlords, namely Wu, Shu, and Wei, engaged in a tournament.  Among the three, Wei had the strongest 
military power over Wu and Shu.  Wei had the incentive to stage war and conquer Wu and Shu.  However, a 
collusion between Wu and Shu would prevent invasion.  Wu (Shu) would not benefit from invading Shu (Wu) as 
the demise or weakening of either one of them by the war would benefit Wei.   
The lesson can be translated to workers’ tournaments when employees face the uncertainty of winning 
the tournament even if they engage in sabotage.  This uncertainty can be created in the following situations: 1) a 
destructive activity involves a cost that lowers one’s payoff.; 2) a saboteur has to exert a very high level of effort 
in order to outperform another co-worker who is not sabotaged.  A destructive activity reduces a competitor’s 
performance to zero but the saboteur’s own performance is also reduced.  If the saboteur does not exert a high 
level of effort, another co-worker who only needs to offer a low level of effort would win the prize; 3) a worker 
may reciprocate sabotage.  If two employees are sabotaged, the remaining employee may win the tournament at a 
130   Kean Siang Ch’ng /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  91 ( 2013 )  128 – 139 
very low cost; 4) an employee can freeride on the destructive activity of his co-workers.  It is in the best interest 
of the employee to see his competitors sabotage each other. 
Two experimental treatments were conducted to investigate the productive and destructive behaviours.  
The results from the first treatment with two employees conform to the existing theory that an opportunity to 
sabotage is counterproductive; employees engage in sabotage more than productive effort to advance their 
position in the tournament.  Since sabotaging enables an employee to advance his relative position, and a higher 
wage spread means a greater incentive to sabotage, what is observed from the treatment is that destructive 
activities are rampant when the wage spread is high.  As a result, employers choose a smaller wage spread to 
diminish the incentive to sabotage. 
In the second treatment with three employees, the employees face the situation that sabotaging does not 
guarantee winning.  This is because a saboteur has to extend a very high effort level in order to win the 
tournament.  The high effort cost therefore renders the strategy unprofitable.  The saboteur also faces the risk of 
his co-worker reciprocating sabotage, in which the two saboteurs’ performances are reduced to zero and the 
remaining co-worker would win the tournament without exerting too much effort.  The results show that 
employees have an incentive to sabotage only when the wage spread is low.  In this treatment, the destructive 
activities are significantly reduced compared to the first treatment.    
The paper is organized as follows.  Section two describes the experimental design and procedures used 
in the paper.  The predictions and hypotheses are discussed in section three.  Section four tests the hypotheses and 
presents the results.  Section five discusses the implications and section six concludes the paper 
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
The experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory in the School of Social Sciences, 
Universiti Sains Malaysia.  A total of 68 subjects from different disciplines were involved in the experiments, 
with 36 subjects in 2-player and 32 subjects in 3-player treatment.  No subject was allowed to participate in more 
than one treatment.  The payoffs were given in fictitious money “units” and were converted to Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM) with a known exchange rate of 10 units=RM0.20.  Payment was made immediately after the experiment 
and was anonymous.  Each treatment lasted for 20 rounds and took approximately 2 to 2.5 hours.  During the 
experiment, the subjects did not know the identity of the employees and employers, and after each round, the 
employees were re-matched with the same employer in the subsequent rounds.  In the 2-player treatment, 3 
subjects were matched in a group with 1 subject randomly selected as the employer and 2 subjects as employees.  
In the 3-player treatment, 4 subjects were matched in a group with 3 employees and 1 employer.  The experiment 
was programmed and conducted with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).    
 Upon entering the lab, the subjects were separated randomly into “employers” and “employees” in two 
different rooms.  The subjects were then given 10 minutes to read the instructions, and the experimenter began to 
explain the procedures.   
The experiment began with the principals selecting a contract type with a different wage spread, as 
shown in Table 1.  The decision was then conveyed to the employees from the same group. 
 
Table 1: Contract types and wage spread offered by employers 
Contract type Wage for employee 
with highest output 
 
Wage for employee 
with lowest output 
Wage spread 
 
1 150 150 0 
2 160 140 20 
3 170 130 40 
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4 180 120 60 
5 190 110 80 
6 200 100 100 
7 210 90 120 
8 220 80 140 
 
 
The payoff of the employers depended on the total output from the employees in the group.   The payoff function 





    (1) 
where q is the output produced by the employees and the parameter  is the multiplier of each unit of output.  In 
the experiment, the parameter 8.    
Upon receiving the employer’s decision, the employees had to make a decision on how much to work 
for the employer.  The effort ranged from 1 to 12 units, as shown in Table 2.  The effort cost increases linearly 
with the effort level.  The employees made the effort decision simultaneously without knowing the decision of 
their other co-worker(s). 
Table 2: The effort levels and the effort costs 
Effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Cost 0 1 4 9 16 25 36 49 64 81 100 121 
 
In the tournament, the reward is based on the relative performance/output of the employee but not the effort 
exerted.  The output of the employee is written as: 
 
qi i i                                                                                                                                                    (2) 
where  is the output of employee i, qi i  is the effort offered by the employee, and  is the random term drawn 
from a uniform distribution (0.1,1).  The random component renders the effort not verifiable and the employer 
can only contract the output of each employee.   
The employee can also advance his position by sabotaging his co-worker(s).  He can only direct the 
sabotage towards one co-worker.  The cost is 2 units’ deduction from the effort level exerted by the employee.  
This reflects a situation in which a saboteur has to invest more time and effort to gather information about the co-
worker’s performance, leaving less time available for productive activity.  The 2 units’ deduction therefore forces 
the saboteur to exert more effort to win in the tournament.  For example, if co-workers offer 3 units of effort 
each, a saboteur has to offer 6 units in order to win the tournament.  
 After each round, each subject was told of their individual payoff and the total output generated by all 
the employees in the group.  The most productive employee received a payoff of wh and the least productive 
employee(s) received w .  A tie was broken with each employee receiving a payoff of 150 units. Only the 
employers knew the output of each individual employee but the employees did not know the effort level exerted 
by another employee.  
l
From the second round onwards, apart from the contract choice, the employees also knew the sabotage 
decision made by other employees in the previous round.  Throughout the paper, the symbol “s” represents 
sabotage and the symbol “ ” represents the effort level.  s  represents employee i attacking employee j and 
 
is employee i attacking either employee j or employee k. 
ij 1
sij(k ) 1
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at t-1, then in the current round the 
employee was told that the co-worker did not sabotage.  The employee was told this was referred to as situation 
1.  If the previous decisions were 
ij 1 sj 0
si 0 and , they were referred to as situation 2, s  and  
were situation 3, and 
sj 0 ij 1 sji 1
si 0 and  were situation 4.   sji 1
In the 3-player treatment, (  is referred to as situation 1, 
 is situation 2, (  is situation 3, and (  is 
situation 4. 
sij(k ) 1;sj 0;sk 0)
(k ) 1;sj 0;ski 1)(si 0;sj 0;sk 0) sij si 0;sj 0;ski 1)
The design allows one to test the incentive effect on employees’ behaviour, since each situation carries 
different expected payoff levels (the incentives of each situation are compared in the later part of the paper).  One 
can observe the destructive or productive behaviour resulting from the situations according to different wage 




Hypothesis 1: A higher wage differential induces more destructive activities and reduces productivity 
among contestants in two-player treatment. 
 
A higher wage spread between the winner and the loser increases competition in the tournament but also 
induces sabotage activities among the contestants.  
In the 2-player sabotage treatment, the expected utility  EU( i, sij 1; j, sj 0) is always higher 
than EU( i, sj 0; j, sj 0)  and EU( i, sij 1; j, sji 1)  is always higher than 
EU( i, si 0; ji, sji 1)† when the wage spread is higher than 0.  In the former, sabotage ensures winning 
the tournament as the contestant’s output is reduced to zero.  In the latter, both contestants are sabotaged and the 
payoff is 150 units each, which is higher than EU( i, si 0; ji, sji 1).  The difference in the payoff between 
the decision to sabotage and the decision not to sabotage increases with the wage differential.  Since the game is 
symmetric, both employees should choose s=1 when the wage spread is larger than 0.   
If an employee decides to sabotage, it is in the best interest of the employee to choose i 3.  This is 
because if employee j’s output is sabotaged, q  is always larger than q . Therefore, both employees should 
choose 
i j
3 when s 1 for all wage spreads.   
The high level of sabotage activities among employees encourages employers to choose a contract type 
with a small wage differential to reduce the incentive to sabotage. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A higher wage spread discourages sabotage among employees in three-player sabotage 
treatment 
 
An employee faces two possibilities: 1) he is not sabotaged and 2) he is sabotaged.  Whether he decides 




represents a situation in which employee i  sabotages employee j but does not receive 
the same treatment from employee j.   is a situation when both employee i and employee j 
exchange sabotage. 
EU( i , sij 1; j , s j 0)
EU ( i , sij 1; j s ji 1)
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payoff is lower in (1) and (2) compared with when he decides not to sabotage others.  For example, in a scenario 
in which the saboteur offers effort of 9 units and the wage spread is 100, in (1) his payoff is 136 and in (2) his 
payoff is 36.  If he decides not to sabotage, in (1) his payoff is 175 and in (2) it is 75.  The difference in payoff 
between the two decisions becomes larger when the wage spread is higher. 
A low sabotage tendency among employees encourages high productivity among contestants in the 
three-player tournament.  Employees are more willing to exert a high effort level in the three-player tournament 
than in the two-player tournament.  The cost of high effort is low in the sense that the employees’ effort is less 
likely to be sabotaged by others.  This encourages employees to exert a high effort level to compete for a high 
prize in the tournament. 
The predictions based on these explanations are: 1) sabotage activities should be lower when the wage 
spread is large, and 2) the frequency of a large wage spread offered by employers should be higher in three-
player treatment than in two-player treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 3: While employees in the two-player tournament are assured that sabotage improves their 
relative position, employees in the three-player treatment find that sabotaging does not guarantee 
advancement.  
 
In the 2-player treatment, employees always have an incentive to sabotage the contestants; the payoff 
from situation 1 (i.e., EU( i, sij 1; j, sj 0) ) is always higher than that in situation 2 (i.e., 
EU( i, sj 0; j, sj 0) ) and the expected payoff from situation 3 (i.e., EU( i, sij 1; j, sji 1) ) is 
always higher than the expected payoff in situation 4 (i.e., EU( i, si 0; ji, sji 1)).  
High sabotage costs discourage destructive activities among employees in the 3-player treatment.  In the 
3-player treatment, a saboteur has to bear 2 extra units of effort as the sabotage cost.  If an employee decides to 
sabotage his co-workers, he has to exert more effort than his co-workers.  For example, if the 2 co-workers offer 
5 units of effort and do not sabotage, the saboteur has to exert more than 8 units of effort (i.e., 6 units+2 units) 
given that the saboteur does not know the effort decisions.  The cost of 8 units of effort is $49, and the payoff to 
the saboteur is $190-$49=$141 if the wage spread is $80.  It is lower than the $150 he will receive if he does not 
sabotage.  If the employee decides to sabotage, the payoff is represented by 
EUi ( i, sij(k ) 1; j, sj 0; k, sk 0)
EUi(
 (i.e., situation 1), which is lower than 
i, si 0; j, sj 0; k, sk 0) (i.e., situation 2).   
 The saboteur also faces the risk that either one of his co-workers could reciprocate sabotage.  In this 
situation, the expected payoff for player i is 




which is lower than the payoff if 
he decides to offer 5 units of effort and does not 
sabotage: i 5, si 0; j 5, sj 0; k 8, ski 1) $110 $16 $94.  The former is referred to 
as situation 3 and the latter as situation 4.     
The predictions according to these different situations are that: 1) employees in the situations 1, 2, 3, and 
4 in 3-player treatment should exhibit a lower destructive tendency than employees in 2-player treatment in the 
same situations, and 2) while a higher wage spread induces sabotage behaviours among employees in 2-player 
treatment, the reverse happens in 3-player treatment with higher sabotage activities in a low wage spread than in 
a high wage spread.  
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3. Results 
 
Result 1: A high wage spread induces sabotage among employees and reduces the effort levels for all the wage 
spreads.  The effort levels are slightly higher than the predicted level in hypothesis 1. 
 
Figure 1 shows the different effort levels and sabotage according to different wage spreads in the two 
treatments.  The primary y-axis represents the effort levels and the secondary y-axis is the frequency of sabotage.  
The high wage spread encourages competition among employees but at the same time induces sabotage activities.  
The figure shows that the sabotage activities increase with the wage spread in the 2-player treatment.  The 
average effort level is 3.48 units (S.D.=0.1228), which is slightly higher than the predicted level in hypothesis 1. 
High destructive tendencies among employees in the 2-player treatment encourage employers to offer 
employment contracts with a low wage spread to diminish the incentive to sabotage.  Figure 2 shows the different 
contract types offered by employers.  Out of a total of 240 contracts offered, 50 contracts were offered with 0 
wage spread (20.83%) and 63 with a wage spread of 20 units (26.25%).   
 
Figure 1: The average effort level and frequency of sabotage according to different wage spread levels 
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Figure 2: Frequency of contract type offered by employers in the two treatments 
Result 2: Because of the high discrepancy in the payoffs, destructive activities are higher in a low wage spread 
than in a high wage spread in a three-player tournament.  
 
Figure 1 shows the sabotage behaviour of the employees in the 3-player treatment according to different 
wage spreads.  The comparison among different wage spreads demonstrates that employees sabotage more when 
the wage spread is small.  The between-treatment comparison shows that employees in 3-player treatment 
sabotage less than employees in 2-player treatment.  The overall average effort level in 3-player treatment is 
4.3083 (S.D. 0.1888), which is statistically higher than the effort in 2-player treatment, 3.4895 (S.D. 0.1228), at 
the 1 per cent significance level (P=0.0000). 
In the 2-player treatment, the saboteur has no benefit from offering a high level of effort as his co-
worker’s output is always lower.  However, in the 3-player treatment, the employee can sabotage only once and 
has to compete with another co-worker.  In this treatment, the saboteur has to exert a high level of effort to ensure 
he wins the tournament.  The high effort costs incurred by the saboteur render destructive activity unprofitable.  
Due to the high sabotage tendency among employees in a low wage spread, employers offer an 
employment contract with a large wage spread.  Figure 2 shows that out of the total of 160 different types of 
contract offered by employers, 13 contracts have a wage spread of 40 units (13.12%), 24 contracts have 60 units 
(15%), 27 contracts have 80 units (17%), 25 contracts have 100 units (16%), and 29 contracts have a wage spread 
of 120 units (18%).  The average wage spread in 3-player treatment is 77.5 units (S.D. 3.0753) and in 2-player 
treatment it is 46.5833 (S.D. 2.7277).   
 
Result 3: In terms of destructive behaviour, the employees in the two-player treatment react to different levels of 
wage spreads more than the situational effects, but the employees in the three-player treatment are less sensitive 
to wage spreads than situational effects. 
Table 3 reports the results of the regression in the two treatments. 
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Table 3: The results of the logistic regression for the two treatments 
Logistic regression with sabotage as the dependent variable 
                                     2-player 3-player 
Cont                              -0.3838*  1.0061*** 
 (-1.53)  (2.59) 
D2=1 and 0  -1.5006*** -2.0248*** 
otherwise   (-4.93)  (-3.76) 
 
D3=1 and 0  -0.1106 -0.7482* 
otherwise   (-0.36)  (-1.72) 
 
D4=1 and 0  -0.9560***                 -1.8929*** 
otherwise   (-2.96)  (-4.19) 
 
Wage spread   0.0196***                  0.0071** 
   (6.92)  (2.06) 
Log likelihood            -257.3967 -180.0653 
2                                113.10   35.67 
N                                  456   293 
Note: The logit model takes the form of ln
p
1 p 1 2
D2 3D3 ... 7 wage  with dummy variables D2=situation2, 
D3=situation3, and D4=situation4.  *** represents 1% s.l., ** 5% s.l., and * 10% s.l.  The parentheses are the Z-statistics.  The table reports 
the log odds of the coefficients. 
 
 The regression results reveal that employees react differently to the wage spread in the two treatments.  
With every unit increase in wage spread, the log odds of sabotage increase by 0.0196 compared with 0.0071 in 
the 3-player treatment.  It suggests that employees in the 3-player treatment are less sensitive to the wage spread.  
In order to find the probability of destructive activities among employees, the log odd coefficients from the 
regression were converted to the probability for each wage spread.  Figure 3 illustrates the different destructive 
behaviours among the employees resulting from the different wage levels.  The figure reveals that destructive 
activities are rampant among employees in the 2-player treatment, especially when the wage spread is higher than 
40 units.  Employees in the 3-player treatment have a higher probability of sabotage when the wage spread is 
lower than 60 and the probability remains in the range of 0.59–0.69 in the higher wage spreads.    
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Figure 3: The probability of sabotage according to the wage spread in the two treatments 
 
Because of the similar circumstances, a comparison can be made between situation 1 in 2-player 
treatment with the same situation in 3-player treatment, situation 2 in 2-player treatment with situation 2 in 3-
player treatment, and so on for situation 3 and situation 4. Table 4 and Table 5 show the probability of sabotage 
in each situation. In the 2-player treatment, the employees respond to all the situations with a high probability of 
sabotage.  However, the employees in the 3-player treatment respond to each situation with a low probability of 
sabotage.  A low level of destructive behaviours can be observed even when the wage spread is high. 
 
Table 4: The probability of sabotage for each situation in two-player treatment 
Situation 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 
1 0.4052 0.5021 0.5988 0.6885 0.7659 0.8288 0.8776 0.9139 
2 0.1319 0.1836 0.2498 0.3301 0.4218 0.5192 0.6152  
3 0.3788 0.4745 0.5720 0.6642 0.7456 0.8126 0.8652 0.9048 
4 0.2075 0.2792 0.3646 0.4594 0.5571 0.6606 0.7338 0.8032 
 
Table 5: The probability of sabotage for each situation in three-player treatment 
Situation 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 
1 0.7322 0.7593 0.7844 0.8076 0.8288 0.8482 0.8656 0.8814 
2 0.2653 0.2940 0.3245  0.3899 0.4244 0.4596 0.4953 
3 0.5641 0.5989 0.6326 0.6651 0.6962 0.7255 0.7530 0.7787 
4 0.2918 0.3221 0.3541 0.3873 0.4218 0.4569 0.4925 0.5282 
 
The employees in the treatments react rationally to each incentive provided in every situation.  In the 
two-player treatment, it is always in the best interest of employees to sabotage regardless of their co-worker’s 
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Although staff competition can enhance productivity, it also creates an incentive to sabotage in order to 
improve one’s relative standing.  The tournament prize created by the management, such as promotion, a year-
end performance bonus, and other forms of recognition, promote productivity among staff members, but at the 
same time also create an incentive to sabotage.  Among the practical solutions available to the management, wage 
compression (Lazear, 1989), external recruitment, ex ante designation of a successor, and group compensation 
(Chen, 2003) could help to reduce the destructive activities, but at the same time sacrifice the incentive to be 
productive. 
The management should know that employees sabotage because they know it will improve their 
standing in the tournament without exerting a high level of effort.  Therefore, the incentive can be diminished if 
employees know that sabotaging can reduce a co-worker’s performance, but does not guarantee their winning.  
This can be achieved in a tournament with more than two employees.  In this competition, another co-worker 
may outperform a saboteur who sabotages a co-worker.  If the saboteur receives sabotage from this co-worker, he 
and the co-worker suffer low performance, but another co-worker who does not sabotage and offers a low level 
of effort wins the tournament.  Even if the employee sabotages and other co-workers do not sabotage, his payoff 
is still lower than when he competes with effort only.  This is because he has to bear a very high cost through 
observing co-workers’ performance and spending time planning the sabotage, thus reducing the time he has to 
invest in productive activities. Therefore, a rational employee would find that sabotaging does not help to 
increase his chance of winning the tournament, and the only option left to improve his standing is to increase his 
effort level.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis presents the results of different tournament designs to investigate employees’ productive and 
destructive behaviours.  In the tournament, the employees can either offer a high level of effort or engage in 
sabotage to improve their relative position.  The decision to sabotage is shown to be induced by the assurance 
that destructive activity can advance one’s opportunity to win the prize.  This assurance arises when one can 
direct the sabotage against the right competitor.  When this assurance is diminished in the three-player 
tournament, the destructive activities evidenced in the two-player tournament are significantly reduced. This 
happens when the saboteur has to bear a sabotage cost and the destructive action does not help him win the 
tournament. When the relative standing is not assured even if the employee sabotages others, the incentive to 
sabotage is diminished. A low level of sabotage in this tournament design does not compromise the incentive to 
compete; in fact, the employees exert a higher effort level to compete and the employers select a large 
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